Administrative Rule 2.160

POLK COUNTY CORRUPTION

Vera Peskan's

POLK COUNTY MOST WANTED LIST

THE man FEATURED BELOW is Responsible For The Victims Having NO VOICE , NO REMEDY, NO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, IN POLK COUNTY

HE IS TO BE CONSIDERED DANGEROUS AND THE TARGET OF OUR INVESTIGATION

IF HE HAS DENIED YOU DUE PROCESS BY WANT OF PROSECUTION, AS HE HAS ME AND THOUSANDS OF OTHERS, SEND US A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS.

A PETITION IS NOW IN EFFECT TO DEMAND HIS REMOVAL FROM OFFICE

Get Him Out of Office!!

MELVIN R. HORNE, PETITIONER V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

   No. 87-1013

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1987

   On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

   Brief for the United States in Opposition

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Questions presented
   Opinion below
   Jurisdiction
   Statement
   Argument
   Conclusion

                             OPINION BELOW

   The judgment order of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 4) is
unpublished.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 2, 1987.
A petition for rehearing was denied on August 24, 1987 (Pet. App. 5).
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on October 23, 1987.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

                          QUESTIONS PRESENTED

   1. Whether the indictment was constructively amended by the proof
at trial.

   2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain petitioner's
conspiracy conviction.

   3. Whether the district court's jury instructions on conspiracy
constituted plain error.

   4. Whether the district court properly instructed the jury on the
defense of good faith.

                               STATEMENT

   Petitioner and his law partner, Mallory E. Horne, were charged in a
13-count indictment returned in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Florida. Count 1 of the indictment charged
that from July 1, 1980, to October 28, 1983, petitioner and Mallory
Horne conspired with an unindicted co-conspirator, Robert John Dugan,
to defraud the Internal Revenue Service in the collection of taxes (18
U.S.C. 371). The remaining counts charged petitioner and Mallory
Horne with mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343),
and Travel Act violations (18 U.S.C. 1952). After a jury trial,
petitioner was convicted of conspiring to defraud the Internal Revenue
Service (Count 1), wire fraud (Count 2), mail fraud (Count 7), and use
of an international wire communication to distribute the proceeds of
an unlawful activity (Count 12). He was sentenced to five years in
prison to be followed by five years of probation. Mallory Horne was
acquitted on all charges. The court of appeals summarily affirmed
(Pet. App. 4).

   1. The evidence from the six-and-a-half week trial is set forth in
detail in the government's brief in the court of appeals (at 1-16).
The evidence showed that petitioner masterminded a money laundering
operation to hide from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) illegally
obtained assets of Robert John Dugan, a drug smuggler and an
unindicted co-conspirator. Besides Dugan's testimony, the evidence
included a number of audio and video recordings of conversations
between petitioner and an informant, Mark Stroud, as well as
recordings of conversations between petitioner and an undercover FBI
agent. During those conversations, petitioner outlined the method he
used to launder Dugan's assets, he described the details of the scheme
to defraud the IRS, he discussed the fraudlent documentation that he
prepared to facilitate the scheme, and he rehearsed Dugan on the false
scenario that Dugan was to present when questioned by law enforcement
authorities. In addition, petitioner gave two confessions
acknowledging that he laundered Dugan's drug money and hid it from the
IRS in an offshore corporation that he set up for that purpose.

   2. In 1978, Dugan began importing marijuana and cocaine into the
United States as a pilot or co-pilot on trips to South America.
Following his arrest in November 1978 for marijuana smuggling, Dugan
hired petitioner as his attorney and told petitioner about his plans
to continue smuggling drugs. Using money derived from his drug
smuggling activities, Dugan purchased a house in late 1978 and made
$170,000 in cash improvements on it between 1979 and 1980. In July
1980, Dugan bought a Piper Aztec airplane for $73,000 in cash. Five
months later, Dugan bought 160 acres of land in Levy County, Florida,
to develop an airfield to hide and house smugglers' planes.

   Petitioner handled the arrangements and paperwork for each of those
transactions. He also told Dugan that the purchase of the assets in
his own name would likely lead to an audit by the IRS and possible
forfeiture of the assets because they were purchased with the proceeds
of drug smuggling. In late 1980 and early 1981, Dugan asked
petitioner to set up a scheme to launder his cash and property.
Petitioner consulted with Mallory Horne, who arranged a meeting with
Mark Stroud, a former bank vice president.

   At a meeting on January 7, 1981, petitioner and his law partner
told Stroud that Dugan was a convicted drug smuggler who had an
airplane, a large tract of land and between $300,000 and $500,000 in
cash that he needed to hide from the IRS. In a later meeting that
same day, petitioner told Stroud that he needed to put Dugan's assets
in someone else's name. Although Dugan was reluctant to use Stroud's
services, he eventually agreed to have Stroud launder his money after
petitioner and Mallory Horne assured him that Stroud could be trusted.
Unknown to petitioner and Mallory Horne, however, Stroud was a
government informant, and he alerted the FBI about the scheme to hide
Dugan's assets. In subsequent recorded meetings on January 15 and 26,
petitioner discussed with Dugan and Stroud the details of a plan to
hide Dugan's assets by placing them in the name of an offshore
company. On January 29, 1981, petitioner and Stroud traveled to the
Bahamas and set up the offshore company, Beauly Investments Ltd.

   After he returned from the Bahamas, petitioner proceeded to create
false documents to show that Beauly Investments Ltd. had lent Dugan
money for the down payment on his house and the yearly payments on the
160-acre tract of land. In December 1981, petitioner created
additional false documents showing that the 160-acre tract of land had
been transferred to Beauly Investments Ltd. because Dugan had not
repaid the loan. To explain the source of Dugan's income, petitioner
also prepared a bogus employment contract between Dugan and Beauly
Investments Ltd. reflecting that Dugan was the property manager of the
160-acre tract of land. Since the airplane was purchased before
Beauly Investments Ltd. was formed, petitioner and Stroud arranged to
have another individual, Donald Carter, listed as its owner.

   On September 10, 1981, Stroud introduced petitioner to an
undercover FBI agent, Matthew Pellegrino, who posed as a money
launderer named Matthew Garfolo. Two weeks later, petitioner met with
Pellegrino and discussed establishing offshore companies for two of
Dugan's associates. Later in October 1981, petitioner asked
Pellegrino to assist him in laundering $50,000 in cashier's checks
that Dugan had withdrawn from his Cayman Islands account and made
payable to petitioner. For a fee, Pellegrino agreed to negotiate the
checks in order to prevent the funds from being traced back to Dugan
or petitioner.

   Throughout the period of the undercover operation, petitioner and
Dugan continually expressed concern that the IRS would audit Dugan.
In recorded meetings on October 20 and 22, 1982, petitioner met with
Dugan and Pellegrino to plot a strategy to lie to the IRS about
Dugan's finances. During those sessions, petitioner questioned Dugan
to assure himself that Dugan understood the false explanation that he
would give about where he obtained the money to purchase his assets
and how those assets ended up in the names of other persons and
entities. Petitioner, Dugan, and Pellegrino also discussed an
additional $300,000 in traceable assets acquired by Dugan between 1978
and 1982 that had not yet been hidden by phony documents or offshore
companies. Petitioner suggested a number of methods to conceal those
assets, such as attributing certain monies to Dugan's deceased
brother, preparing additional phony loans, destroying ledgers
detailing Dugan's smuggling activities, characterizing money used to
fund Beauly Investments Ltd. as a lease payment, and telling the IRS
that Dugan only brokered the purchase of the Piper Aztec airplane. By
the end of the meetings, petitioner, Dugan, and Pellegrino had made up
explanations for all but $20,000 of the $300,000 in traceable assets.

   On October 27, 1982, petitioner was interviewed by an IRS agent.
Petitioner lied to the agent about Dugan's financial affairs.
Consistent with the scheme he had set up, petitioner told the IRS
agent that Beauly Investments Ltd. was a legitimate group of offshore
investors and that Dugan had borrowed money from the company in
connection with his purchase of the 160-acre tract of land. He also
told the agent that the property had reverted to Beauly Investments
Ltd. when Dugan was unable to repay the loans and that Dugan was
employed by the company. To support those claims, petitioner produced
the fraudulent documents that he had prepared earlier.

   3. In March 1983, FBI agents confronted Dugan with their evidence
of the money laundering scheme, and he agreed to cooperate in the
investigation. Subsequently, on October 28, 1983, a search warrant
was executed at petitioner's law office. In the course of the search
the agents seized the fraudulent documents prepared by petitioner to
hide Dugan's assets, receipts reflecting petitioner's travel, and
records of wire-transfers of money. After learning that Pellegrino
was an FBI agent, petitioner stated that he wanted to see the United
States Attorney. Later that evening, petitioner confessed twice to
laundering Dugan's drug money through Beauly Investments Ltd.

                               ARGUMENT

   1. Petitioner first contends (Pet. 7-12) that the proof at trial
constructively amended the indictment because the evidence showed that
Dugan began cooperating with the government in March 1983, whereas the
indictment alleged that the conspiracy continued until October 28,
1983. Petitioner argues that since Mallory Horne was acquitted and
since petitioner could not have conspired with a government agent, the
conspiracy count was constructively amended to allege that the
conspiracy ended eight months earlier than alleged in the indictment.
That argument is wholly without merit.

   The jury's acquittal of Mallory Horne is plainly irrelevant to
whether the indictment was constructively amended. A constructive
amendment occurs when the evidence at trial or the jury instructions
broaden the scope of the indictment by allowing a defendant to be
convicted of an offense different from that charged in the indictment.
See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 135-145 (1985); Stirone
v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-219 (1960). That did not happen
here; the proof at trial established the same conspiracy that was
alleged in the indictment. The evidence that Dugan began cooperating
with the government before the alleged termination date of the
conspiracy did not alter an essential or material element of the
conspiracy charged in the indictment. At most, that evidence narrowed
the indictment by showing that the conspiracy was of shorter duration.
It could not have prejudiced petitioner's right to be apprised of the
charges against him or his right to plead the indictment as a bar to
subsequent prosecutions. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749,
763-764 (1962). Moreover, because the indictment alleged and evidence
was introduced to show that petitioner also conspired with Mallory
Horne, the mere fact that Dugan withdrew in March 1983 did not mean
that the conspiracy terminated at that time.

   2. Petitioner makes the related contention (Pet. 15-18) that the
conspiracy was "legally impossible" because the evidence was
insufficient to show that he conspired with either Dugan or Mallory
Horne. That contention is predicated in the first instance on the
erroneous assertion (Pet. 11-12) that petitioner could not be found
guilty of conspiring with Dugan because Dugan became a government
informant in March 1983. Petitioner's assertion is plainly wrong
since a conspiracy is complete once there is an agreement to
accomplish an unlawful object and one or more overt acts are
undertaken to implement the agreement. See Iannelli v. United States,
420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694
(1975). In this case, the evidence showed that the conspiracy began
in 1980 and that Dugan and petitioner actively participated in the
money laundering scheme to defraud the IRS for two-and-a-half years
before Dugan decided to cooperate with the government. To be sure,
petitioner could not conspire with Dugan after Dugan began cooperating
with the government. But Dugan's withdrawal in March 1983 did not
affect either his or petitioner's liability for the conspiracy or the
substantive offenses occurring prior to that time; it merely
precluded Dugan from being liable for substantive offenses occurring
after his withdrawal. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 797 F.2d
915, 916-917 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Marolla, 766 F.2d
457, 461 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1232
(7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 864 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977).

   Petitioner's contention that a conspiracy was legally impossible is
also predicated on the erroneous proposition (Pet. 16-18) that he
could not have conspired with Mallory Horne because the jury acquitted
Mallory Horne. As this Court has repeatedly made clear, jury verdicts
need not be consistent, because a jury may render an erroneous verdict
for reasons of lenity, compromise, or mistake. United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984); Standefer v. United States 447 U.S.
10, 22-25 (1980); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279
(1943); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-394 (1932). The
jury's acquittal of Mallory Horne therefore is not equivalent to a
finding by the jury that petitioner did not conspire with him. See
United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 331-332 (5th Cir.
1980). Instead, the determination whether petitioner's conviction
should be upheld is judged by the well-established principles
governing review of the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. at 67. Under that standard of review, the evidence
was clearly sufficient to establish that petitioner conspired with
Mallory Horne as well as with Dugan. /1/

   3. Petitioner's real complaint (Pet. 10-11, 18-21) appears to be
that the jury may have found him guilty of conspiring with Dugan after
Dugan began cooperating with the government because the district court
did not give the jury an instruction based on Sears v. United States,
343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965), to the effect that a person cannot
conspire with a government informant. That contention is likewise
meritless.

   As petitioner concedes (Pet. 19), he neither requested a Sears
instruction nor objected to the district court's failure to give the
jury such an instruction. His claim therefore must be measured
against the plain error standard. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30, 52(b); United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982). Moreover, petitioner did
not argue before the court of appeals that the district court erred in
failing to give a Sears instruction. Consequently, even the question
whether the failure to give the additional instruction was plain error
is not properly before this Court. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 443 (1984); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7
(1977); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 (1970).

   In any event, the plain error doctrine authorizes a reviewing court
"to correct only 'particularly egregious errors,' * * * (and) is to be
'used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage
of justice would otherwise result.'" United States v. Young, 470 U.S.
1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 & n.14
(1982)). See also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (in
reviewing jury instructions, the plain error doctrine must be reserved
for the "rare case"). No such error occurred here. In setting forth
the essential elements of a conspiracy, the district court charged the
jury that it was required to find that "one of the conspirators during
the existence of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of
the methods (or 'overt acts') described in the indictment" and that
"such 'overt act' was knowingly committed at or about the time alleged
in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy"
(Pet. App. 16). The ten overt acts set forth in the indictment (R.E.
22-23) were alleged to have occurred between January 8, 1981, and
February 4, 1982, before Dugan began cooperating with the government.
Accordingly, the district court's jury charge did not allow the jury
to find petitioner guilty of conspiracy based on his association with
Dugan after March 1983. The jury charge, therefore, clearly did not
rise to the level of plain error.

   4. Finally, petitioner contends (Pet. 12-15) that the decision
below conflicts with United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716 (1984) (en
banc), in which the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant charged with
mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud is entitled to have the
jury instructed on the defense of good faith when the instruction is
timely requested and the evidence supports that defense. Petitioner,
however, never claimed before the court of appeals that the district
court's jury instructions on the defense of good faith were
inadequate. Petitioner may not assert that claim now for the first
time. In any event, petitioner's belated complaint about the jury
charge is plainly without merit because the district court in fact
instructed the jury on the defense of good faith. /2/

                              CONCLUSION

   The petitioner for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

   Respectfully submitted.

   CHARLES FRIED

      Soliciator General

   JOHN C. KEENEY

      Acting Assistant Attorney General

   JOSEPH C. WYDERKO

      Attorney

   MARCH 1988

   /1/ Petitioner relies (Pet. 16, 18) on the rule requiring
consistency in conspiracy verdicts derived from Herman v. United
States, 289 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897 (1961).
In Herman, the court held that the acquittal of all but one alleged
co-conspirator in a joint trial mandates acquittal of the remaining
co-conspirator. By its terms, that rule did not apply in this case
because petitioner was charged with conspiring not only with Mallory
Horne, but also with an unindicted co-conspirator, Dugan.

   In any event, the validity of the rule articulated by the Fifth
Circuit in Herman is doubtful. The Herman court cited no authority
for the rule and it did not cite, discuss, or distinguish this Court's
decisions in Dunn v. United States, supra, or United States v.
Dotterweich, supra. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has itself questioned
the soundness of the rule and has "limited reliance on (the Herman
rule) except in its narrowest application." United States v. Davila,
698 F.2d 715, 720-721 (5th Cir. 1983). See also United States v.
Albert, 675 F.2d 712, 713 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 331-332 (5th Cir. 1980).

   Most significantly, Herman was decided before this Court decided
United States v. Powell, supra, and Standefer v. United States, supra.
The only court of appeals to have recently reevaluated the Herman
rule has concluded that it does not survive the Powell decision. See
United States v. Valles-Valencia, 823 F.2d 381, 382 (9th Cir. 1987).
See also Government of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138,
142-143 (3d Cir. 1985) (Garth, J., concurring) ("the rule of
consistency since Standefer and Powell is no longer a viable
doctrine"). The Eleventh Circuit recently granted rehearing en banc
to consider the issue. United States v. Andrews, No. 87-3109.

   /2/ Petitioner characterizes (Pet. 20-21) the district court's jury
instruction as "modified and abbreviated" and complains that the jury
was not instructed on his theory of defense. To the contrary, the
district court fully explained the good faith defense to the jury
(R.E. 37):

         Good faith is a complete defense to those charges in the
      indictment alleging "intent to defraud" since good faith on the
      part of the defendant is inconsistent with intent to defraud or
      wilfullness which is an essential part of the charges. The
      burden of proof is not on the defendant to prove his good faith,
      of course, since he has no burden to prove anything. The
      government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
      defendant acted with specific intent to defraud as charged in
      the indictment.

         One who expresses an opinion honestly held by him, or a
      belief honestly entertained by him, is not chargeable with
      fraudulent intent even though his opinions is erroneous or his
      belief is mistaken; and, similarly, evidence which establishes
      only that a person made a mistake in judgment or an error in
      management, or was careless, does not establish fraudulent
      intent. On the other hand, an honest belief on the part of the
      defendant that a particular undertaking was sound and would
      ultimately succeed would not, in and of itself, constitute "good
      faith" as used in these instructions if, in carrying out that
      undertaking, the defendant knowingly made false and fraudlent
      representations to others with intent to deceive them.

Jerry Hill State Attorney 10th Judicial Circuit

Jerry Hill is a lifelong resident of Polk County, Florida. He attended local schools in Winter Haven and graduated from Polk Community College and Florida State University. He received his Bachelor of Science Degree in 1969. In 1972, he received his Juris Doctorate Degree from Stetson Law School.

Mr. Hill started his law career as a full-time Assistant Public Defender. In 1973, he joined the law firm of Billings, Fredrick, Wooten and Honeywell in Orlando and specialized in personal injury work. He returned to Polk County and established his own practice in 1974. In 1981, he took office as the Public Defender for the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, which included, Polk, Hardee and Highlands Counties. In 1984, he was elected State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit and was re-elected without opposition in 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2000. He is past President of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association and he has also served on the Article V Constitutional Review Commission, the Florida Medical Examiners Commission and the Second District Court of Appeal Judicial Nominating Commission. He currently is a member of the Tenth Judicial Circuit Grievance Committee and the Violent Crime and Drug Control Council. Is this a joke, or what? He must get paid or the 'drug lords' would not be in total control of Polk county. Give me a plausible explanation for the want of investigation and/or prosecution of the top bananas in the 'meth operations'. People on the street know their names. I have been informed the dealers and users are within the Police and Sheriff Dept. They only arrest the poorest of the oppressed. Have you ever seen a cop, judge or deputy sheriff arrested for any crime in Polk county? They cover-up all crimes among themselves, as it could open a 'pandora's box' when publicly scrutinized! Read the paragraph below to reference drug connection. (refused to prosecute Betty Dugan for assault and battery she committed against me).

Jerry Hill Stated that my case was closed in 2005! I am, at present, still attempting to have a Grand Jury convened to bring Betty Dugan, et al, to justice under Rico. His 'henchmen' were filmed in front of the courthouse, intimidating and threatening, we, the Sovereign people, during peaceful demonstration. The sheriff department sends their 'henchmen to intimidate, threaten, take pictures of us, our signs, tell us we have no case, etc. Little did they know that this only served to fuel the fire and create tenacity to NEVER BACK DOWN!

WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED PERSONS, ON A NEED TO KNOW BASIS , TO HAVE BARS INSTALLED ON THE SECOND FLOOR TO IMPEDE HIS FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO MAKE A QUICK EXIT, AS THE NET BEING CAST ABOUT HIM BEGINS TO BE BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE AND HIS NEFARIOUS DEALINGS COME TO LIGHT.

In-breeding could be a major factor in his zealous agenda of keeping the halls of justice open only to the corrupt

He and the 'good 'ol boys' are inter-married and nepotism is rampant!

If he were busy doing his 'job description' and not operating in malfeasance of office, we would not have the dubious distinction of being the METH CAPITOL OF THE NATION, DRUG CAPITOL OF THE SOUTH!!

CASE IN POINT: THE PERSON HE IS AIDING IN DENYING ME ACCESS TO MY HOME (GOING ON FOUR YEARS) IS BETTY DUGAN, WHOSE HUSBAND, ROBERT DUGAN WAS THE BIGGEST DRUG TRAFFICKER AND MONEY LAUNDERER EVER BUSTED BY THE FBI, IN FLORIDA. HE WAS CONVICTED AND SERVED TWO TERMS FOR SUCH. THE CASE MAY BE REVIEWED BY CLICKING ON 'MELVIN HORNES' APPEAL. THIS BROUGHT DOWN THE UPPER CRUST OF JUDICIARY AND WELL-KNOWNS, SUCH AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE MALLORY HORNE, ETC. circa 1980 See "indicted" by Mallory Horne circa 1986.

Do you see a possible 'drug connection' link?

BY THE WAY, SHERIFF GRADY JUDD IS, WITHOUT COURT MANDATE, ALSO KEEPING ME FROM GOING TO MY HOME AND UNLAWFULLY ARRESTED ME, WHEN I ATTEMPTED TO ENTER.

In conjunction with a recent news article about the 'magnificent one', Jerry Hill, there should be a way to charge anyone writing fallacies and bunk, in order to keep the likes of Jerry Hill in power, with a crime against the People!

I DEMAND A RETRACTION FROM THE AUTHOR. WE ARE THOUSANDS STRONG AND ARE ABOUT TO INSTITUTE AN INVESTIGATION INTO HIS FAILURE TO SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION AND DENIAL OF OUR CIVIL RIGHTS, PURSUANT HIS OATH OF OFFICE. AND WHILE WE'RE AT IT, LET'S CHECK OUT HIS FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND/OR DISCLOSURES. I'll lay odds they don't have any relevance to his annual salary as state attorney. How about checking out this nasty evil doer pictured below.

Don't vote these criminals back in office or deserve what you get!!

FEATURED PLAYER IN UPPER
ECHELON OF CORRUPTION:

Court Administrator

Nick Sudzina

Court Administrator Nick Sudzina

255 N. Broadway Ave.
Bartow, FL 33830
(863) 534-4686
(863)534-4699 FAX

Contact the Court Administrator's Office.

Call and demand his job description. If he does not give it to you, send him a certified notice of non-compliance.

Does the right hand know what the left hand is doing? Watch closely.